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DISPOSITION OF THE IRRESPONSIBLE:
PROTECTION FOLLOWING COMMITMENT
Travis H. Lewin*
year more of our fellow citizens are involuntarily committed
to a mental institution of one sort or another than are incarcerated for the commission of a crime.1 To those committed, the walls
and barred windows of the hospital, as well as the treatment and
mode of living, are probably not significantly different from those
of a prison. This is particularly the case with those confined for treatment by court order or by some special statutory procedure following acquittal of a crime on grounds of insanity. Yet these mentally
ill, even after perpetrating what would otherwise have been a criminal act, are not criminals; their involuntary stay in the hospital is,
at least in part, intended for their own protection and treatment, not
as punishment for their actions.2
Another reason for their commitment lies, of course, in the societal interest in protecting the general populace from those persons
who have shmvn themselves to be dangerous.3 Those who commit
antisocial acts, whether we choose to brand them as criminals or
excuse them because they are so ill that reason and rational motivation are impossible, may have an enhanced potential for committing
future acts dangerous to others.4 As our attitudes toward criminal
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I. See Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2. See People v. Nunes, 58 Ill. App. 2d 55, 207 N.E.2d 143 (1965). See also Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87
(1967); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1139-40 (1967); cf.
Rice, Mental Capacity To Stand Trial-Part II, Constitutional Issues, I WASHBURN L.
REv. 176, 179 (1961).
3. See s. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 122 (1962); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To
PUNISH 118-19 (1956); Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal on Grounds of Insanity, 22
Mo. L. REv. 293, 298 (1962); Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 409, 421 (1961). See also Overholser v. O'Beime,
302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
State v. Toon, 172 La. 631, 135 S. 7 (1931).
Involuntary commitment procedures, other than those statutes providing for
automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal, typically require a judicial
finding that the subject is, in fact, "dangerous." If this, rather than protection or
treatment of the committed, is the proper rationale, the standard of proof to justify
detention for treatment should be correspondingly higher. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1291 (1966).
4. It has been pointed out, however, that there is no empiric evidence that the
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responsibility become more liberal and the concept of legal insanity
expands,11 this society-protection interest is likely to emerge in a
provision for the commitment to a mental hospital of all those acquitted on grounds of insanity. 6 Indeed today, although not all states
provide for automatic commitment-that is, commitment immediately following an insanity acquittal without a hearing of further
evidence or a finding as to the subject's present state of mind-commitment typically follows an insanity acquittal in most of the courts
in this country.7
mentally ill are any more dangerous to society than the mentally healthy. Hearings
at 270.
5. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 241 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("It is
simply that an accused is not responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or defects."). This definition, however, has subsequently been tightened. See Hightower v. United States, 325 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963); McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
6. The District of Columbia automatic commitment statute, for example, was
enacted in direct response to the Durham decision. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S.
705, 715 (1962); Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity
Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 941-42 (1961).
7. This is the common procedure in every American jurisdiction with the possible
exception of the federal courts outside the District of Columbia. See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 365 (1954). Although legislation now pending would
provide for automatic commitment in federal courts outside the District of Columbia
[S. 3689, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 17033, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)], no such
procedure is currently authorized. Rather, most federal courts have taken the position
that they must release the defendant after an insanity acquittal. Pope v. United States,
372 F.2d 710, 731 (8th Cir. 1967); Freeman v. United States, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir.
1966); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962); Sauer v. United States, 241
F.2d 640, 651 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957); Dixon v. Steele, 104 F. Supp.
904 (W".D. Mo. 1951). See also United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
Contra, Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1960).
The state statutes which provide for commitment following an insanity acquittal
are of two types: "automatic" and "non-compulsory." Under the "automatic" variety
(sometimes termed "mandatory" or "compulsory'1, the trial court has no discretion
whatsoever following an insanity acquittal, but must commit the defendant to an appropriate institution. See Figinski, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 3. Seventeen
jurisdictions now have this sort of automatic scheme: Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts (murder and manslaughter cases only),
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin, the
District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.
The remainder of the states provide for some form of noncompulsory commitment
after an insanity acquittal, but the provisions take on a variety of forms. Seventeen
states eschew any specified commitment procedure, leaving it entirely up to the discretion of the trial court: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Massachusetts
(cases other than murder and manslaughter), New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
West Virginia. Other states furnish commitment standards and require that either
the judge or jury make a specific finding as to commitment-either at trial or at a
separate hearing, which then becomes mandatory: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. A few states have a
variant of this last procedure, leaving it to the court's discretion whether to cause
an inquiry into the defendant's mental state following an insanity acquittal, but pro-
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The various state procedures for commitment following an insanity acquittal raise a whole range of questions, from their constitutionality to their wisdom and efficacy.8 Intelligent analysis of these
methods of disposition of the irresponsible cannot, of course, ignore
any of these questions. One inquiry, however, has seldom been made
and seems of especially great import today: if mandatory commitment is to be justified on the basis that society has a right to at least
a reasonable period of close examination to insure that the defenviding that the court be bound thereafter by the results of the inquiry: Idaho, Louisiana
(noncapital felonies and misdemeanor cases), and Tennessee. And, of course, some
statutory schemes do not fit even these categorizations. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 59,
§§ 7, 8(a) (1957). These two sections have not yet been judicially reconciled, but seem
to provide that if the jury acquits and finds that the defendant continues to be insane,
commitment is mandatory. If, however, the jury acquits on insanity grounds but
neglects to make such a finding, the court apparently has discretion to order commitment.
8. For representative literature on some of these questions, see generally M.
GUTI'MACHER &: H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952); F. LINDMAN &: D.
MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE LAW (1961); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND
PsYCHIATRY (1963); Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy,
57 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1959); Comment, supra note 2; Note, supra note 3.
Perhaps at the core of the problem is the fact that the philosophy and administration of the commitment-following-insanity statutes have changed but little in the
168 years since the attempted assassination of King George III by a mentally deranged
Englishman, one Hadfield, prompted the first automatic commitment statute. See
Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (1800), 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94 (1800). Only a small
minority of American states, for example, have established procedures for an adequate
psychiatric examination of the defendant either before or after commitment. Only
three states require that the accused be given a psychiatric examination within a
prescribed period after commitment or provide for periodic examinations: Georgia,
Louisiana, and Missouri. Only two of the automatic commitment states provide for
a hearing on the question of recovery before commitment: Hawaii by statute, HAWAII
REv. LAws § 258-38 (Supp. 1963), and Ohio by judicial decision, Collins v. Campbell, 4
Ohio App. 2d 42, 211 N.E.2d 96 (1965). In an important case decided while this
article was in galley, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, drawing
from Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), held that although a defendant may
be automatically committed following an insanity acquittal for a period of time
sufficient for examination and determination of his present mental condition, failure
to provide a judicial hearing at the end of this period would be a denial of equal
protection of the laws. That is, some judicial procedure corresponding to that for
civil commitment must be afforded. Bolton v. Harris, 36 U.S.L.W. 2,535 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 1, 1968) (Bazelon, C.J.). This case may presage a reexamination of the constitutionality of automatic commitment statutes. Furthermore, no jurisdiction with an
automatic commitment statute has seen fit to provide the indigent defendant with an
attorney to represent and assist him during his period of confinement, although most
states provide an attorney to help with a specific petition or hearing. E.g., Robertson v.
Cameron, 224 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1963) (attorney provided at hearing in absence of
statutory provision); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2260 (1964) (counsel for indigents at
civil commitment hearings). Only one state has provided the automatically committed
indigent with funds to hire a psychiatrist of his own choice. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-8-4(16) (Supp. 1965). Some courts have, however, indicated that they would appoint
such experts for indigent patients. Watson v. Cameron, 312 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
People ex. rel. Anonymous No. 1 v. La Burt, 17 N.Y.2d 738, 217 N.E.2d 31 (1966). It
seems apparent, then, that as of this writing, the aims of the states are something other
than rehabilitative.
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dant can be safely returned to the community and if continuing
hospitalization is premised upon the need to treat him until he is no
longer dangerous to himself or to others, is the patient being released
promptly upon qualifying for discharge? Does the law or medical
practice afford the patient adequate assistance in implementing his
treatment and rehabilitation? If these are answered in the negative,
is there any remedy?
These questions are brought into sharp focus by the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Rouse v. Cameron/! In that case, the same court which adopted an
expanded notion of legal insanity in Durham10 held that a person
committed under the District of Columbia automatic commitment
statute had a judicially enforceable statutory, and perhaps constitutional, right to treatment for his illness. The court declared that
failing adequate treatment, the hospital must release him, and it
reserved to itself the question of what is "adequate" in a particular
case.11 The court further intimated that were there not such a right
to treatment, the statute might be unconstitutional on due process,
equal protection, or cruel and unusual punishment grounds. Just as
Durham stirred members of the legal and medical professions to reexamine and re-evaluate the question of criminal responsibility,12 so
should Rouse activate consideration of the care and treatment of
those deemed irresponsible.
With this in mind, the writer participated in a study of inmates
who were committed to a Michigan hospital for the criminally insane after an insanity acquittal. The study unearthed some troubling
abuses of the treatment process. It demonstrated that patients without competent legal assistance were often abandoned in the hospital,
spending many months and years beyond the time when they could
and should have been released. It demonstrated that the judicial machinery sometimes deliberately and sometimes negligently interferred with treatment programs. Yet, significantly, it also showed that
when patients were able to retain competent and active attorneys to
protect their interests, these abuses were kept to a minimum. It is the
9. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The holding of Rouse was presaged by earlier
warnings that failure to provide suitable treatment might call into question the validity of the automatic commitment statute. See Brown v. Cameron, 353 F.2d 835, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion); Darnel v. Cameron, 348 F.2d 64, 67-68 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
IO. See note 5 supra.
11. The court, moreover, ruled that "continuing failure to provide suitable and
adequate treatment cannot be justified by a lack of staff or facilities." 373 F.2d at 457.
12. See, e.g., Hearings at 433-64, 685-93, 753-96; GLUECK, supra note 3, at 41-103; S.
RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW 1-86 (1965); WEIHOFEN, supra note 3; Moore,
M'Naghten is Dead-or Is It?, 3 HousroN L. REv. 58, 62-76 (1965); Slovenko, Psychiatry,
Criminal Law and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 1963 DuKE L.J. 395, 398-424.
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thesis of this article that the availability of legal counsel is essential
to the effective enforcement of the post-commitment rights of patients committed after insanity acquittals.

I.

THE MICHIGAN EXPERIENCE

The study focused particularly on the twenty-nine persons committed under the Michigan automatic statute since 1939.13 At the
time of the study, 1965-1967, that statute applied only to those acquitted of murder by reason of insanity, although it has since been
broadened to cover all "crimes."14 In addition, occasional reference
is made to data concerning inmates who were acquitted of charges
less than murder, and who were committed under other than the
automatic procedures. It is important to note that the conclusions
of this study are equally applicable to all types of commitment procedures following an insanity acquittal.
A. Treatment Failures
In reading this section, the warning of the Rouse court should be
remembered: failure to provide adequate treatment might render a
commitment statute constitutionally suspect. Treatment failures,
then, might threaten the foundation of the entire scheme.15
The patients studied were hospitalized at the Michigan State
Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Ionia (hereinafter referred to
as Ionia). In 1965, the Michigan State Department of Mental Health
authorized a medical audit investigation of Ionia which resulted in a
recommendation that the hospital be phased out and that in the
future persons eligible for commitment be sent to any of several
regional hospitals which treat the noncriminal mentally ill.16 The
basic criticism of the audit was that the hospital had wholly failed
to carry out its function of providing treatment to inmates. The investigation revealed: (1) that the hospital had been unable to attract
physicians with the necessary medical and psychiatric skill and legal
sophistication; 17 (2) that nurses were so fearful of the patients that
13. The study was conducted during the period 1965-1967 at the Michigan State
Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Ionia, Michigan [hereinafter referred to as Ionia]
and culminated in a report to the state mental health department. J. ACHER, R. GUZMAN
& T. LEWIN, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS IN CRIMINAL CAsES-A FIELD STUDY AND REPORT
TO THE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH (1967).
14. Public Act No. 266, [1966] Mich. Acts 378, repealing MICH. CoMP. LAws
§ 766.15c (1948). Section 27b of the Act extends automatic commitment to all "crimes."
15. See 373 F.2d at 453; Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
16. Unpublished Final Report of the Ionia State Hospital Medical Audit Committee
of October 4, 1965. Copy on file with the author.
17. The Medical Audit Committee noted that during the period of the study the
doctor/patient ratio at Ionia was in the neighborhood of 300:I. Id. at 3-4.
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they would not visit the wards at night even when medication was
needed, leaving the matter of the administration of drugs to the
guards; (3) that the physical plant was so old, of such poor design,
and in such bad repair as to preclude modern psychiatric practice; 18
(4) that opportunities for occupational, industrial, or recreational
therapy were almost wholly lacking due to the foregoing reasons;
and (5) that, perhaps influenced by the fact that it operated in a
small rural community near two state correctional institutions, the
treatment program was primarily custodially oriented and that supervision of patients by professional personnel was minimal.
While Ionia, unlike some other mental institutions,19 cannot
justifiably be termed a "hell-hole," the shortages of facilities and
staff have adversely affected the treatment afforded the patients. Our
examination of the Ionia patient records revealed numerous examples of treatment failures. In some cases, patients had not been
thoroughly psychiatrically examined for years on end. In others,
years went by without patients even being observed in a "staffing
conference"-wherein the patient's history and progress are reviewed by the hospital staff for counseling purposes. In one case,
through apparent neglect, the hospital failed to follow up the
scarcely arduous therapeutical recommendations of an experienced
outside psychiatrist; predictably, the juvenile patient involved
suffered a deteriorated mental condition. In another case, even
though an inmate acquitted of murder had been recommended by
the superintendent for release into the community, a security attendant cancelled all his athletic team therapy because someone forgot
to amend the outdated "homicidal" label on his records jacket. Most
of these sorts of treatment failures should in truth be attributed to
understaffed and overcrowded hospital conditions, rather than to
negligence, as such, on the part of the staff.
Negligence can, however, be attributed to the legal profession
for hindering the treatment program in two respects: incorrect preparation of commitment orders and direct judicial interference in the
hospital treatment program. It was not uncommon to find that the
18. The physical plant was characterized as "depressing overcrowded firetraps in
which no one should be required to live." Id. at 3-4.
19. See State v. Gremillion, 168 S.2d 270, 273 (La. App. 1964). See also Hearings at
40-47 (testimony of Albert Deutsch); Halleck, A Critique of Current Psychiatric Roles
in the Legal Process, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 379. Several commentators have indicted the
nation's hospital system for the criminally insane as little more than a vast penal holding compound, with more emphasis on security than treatment of any kind. E.g.,
RUBIN, supra note 12, at 41-42, 149-66 (1965); SZAsz, supra note 8, at 144; Goldstein &,:
Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on the Decision To Release Persons Acquitted By Reasons of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 226-27 (1960); Halleck,
supra at 392; Comment, supra note 3, at 417, n.24 (1961).
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commitment order drafted by an attorney or a judge incorrectly
stated the reason for the commitment. In fact, for the period
from 1959 to 1964, twenty-seven erroneous or ambiguous court
orders were found which misled the hospital as to the patient's legal
status and which may have resulted in the application of wrong treatment goals. In one case, a patient was actually acquitted of a crime
less than murder but the commitment order stated that he was incompetent to stand trial-a different legal status and one which has
different treatment objectives.20 In another case, a man charged with
simple assault was found incompetent to stand trial and ordered
committed. The commitment order, however, referred only to his
mental condition at the time of the alleged criminal act and ordered
that he be kept in confinement for his "natural life," a term reserved
by statute exclusively for defendants acquitted of murder by reason
of insanity. The hospital duly classified him as a "natural life inmate" and handled him as if he had been acquitted of murder and
was homicidal. The effect of this sort of misclassification is not difficult to see: since the standard for competency to stand trial is lower
than that of safe return to the community-the standard that must
be achieved by "natural-life inmates" 21-such a misclassified patient
will likely remain committed longer than is necessary.
It was also not uncommon for courts to interject their edicts into
the treatment process by attempting to define or restrict the type of
activity that a patient should be permitted to engage in while at the
hospital. One court, for example, appended to its commitment order
the notation that the defendant was dangerous and should not be
given outside privileges. Hospital personnel advised that they would
abide by the court's directive if to do so would not interfere with the
patient's treatment and would countermand the order only where
they felt it necessary to do so.22 Consequently, this patient would receive therapeutically valuable outside privileges only when "necessary" and not when merely desirable, as is the test for other patients.
20. The hospital was thus working toward the objective of returning the inmate
so that he could stand trial instead of preparing him for release to the community.
Since it is possible for a mental patient to reach a point in his recovery where he can
safely be returned for trial but where he is not yet progressed to the point where he
may be returned to the community, such an error risks premature release.
21. In theory one can be mentally ill and dangerous to himself and to others, yet
still be competent to stand trial. For discharge of an automatically committed "natural life" patient, he must be found "not [to] be harmful to other persons or their
property." MICH. COMP. LAws § 766.15c (1948). Under the competency test, however,
the defendant need only be "capable of understanding the nature and objects of the
proceedings against him and of comprehending his own condition in reference to
such proceedings and of assisting in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner."
MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.Z/ (1948) • .Both of these statutory provisions were replaced
by Public Act No. 266, [1966] Mich. Acts 378. See also text following note 30 infra.
22. Interviews with A. A. .Birzgalis, Superintendent of the Ionia State Hospital
Administrative and Medical Staff Personnel, July 26, 29, 1966.
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It should be apparent that such judicial restrictions may constitute
an unwarranted interference with the hospital's primary role in
treatment.
The types of treatment abuses discussed in this section point up
the significance of the right to treatment recognized by Rouse. Yet
the mere existence of the right is not meaningful without an effective means of enforcing it. As will be discussed in more detail later,
effective enforcement depends upon the availability of an attorney
to act on behalf of the patient.

B. Detention Beyond the Point of Cure
The most dramatic abuse noted in the Ionia study was the retention in confinement, for substantial periods, of patients who were
apparently eligible for discharge. Significantly, the incidence of such
prolonged unnecessary confinement was greater where the patient
was without counsel; in those cases in which a private attorney was
retained, the abuse was minimized.
For each of the twenty-nine murder defendants, an insanity acquittal meant commitment to Ionia until such time as he should
become sufficiently restored to mental health to be able to rejoin the community. The mechanics of the study required, first,
that the point of medical eligibility for release be determined in
each individual case. It was then a simple matter to compute the
patient's period of confinement subsequent to that point. From a
study of the patient files for each of the twenty-nine, it was determined that the hospital, as a matter of routine, would generally
inaugurate discharge or cooperate with discharge efforts whenever
the patient's condition stabilized for a period of about six months,
as observed and reported by the ward attendants, nurses, and staff
psychiatrists, provided that the patient was no longer psychotic or
otherwise mentally ill.23 Where the patient was not psychotic on admission, discharge efforts would be made when it appeared that the
patient was free of emotional disturbance, had gained "insight" into
his crime, and was generally cooperative with hospital personnel.
The time interval from this point of eligibility for discharge to
actual discharge, or if no such discharge occurred, then to October
31, 1966, was determined in two classes of cases: those where the
patient had the active assistance of an attorney during commitment
and those where the patient lacked such assistance.
23. This practice was confirmed by a file study of approximately fifty incompe•
tency-to-stand-trial patients, which at that time were subject to the same "restored to
sanity" standard for discharge as those automatically committed. Ionia staff personnel
were also consulted and agreed that our findings as to the discharge pattern were
substantially correct. Interview with Ionia Medical Staff personnel, October 25, 1966.
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The study revealed that twelve of the twenty-nine patients had
been discharged, one died, and the remainder were still in the hospital. Only one patient secured a release without the active assistance
of an attorney and she spent six and one-half years in the hospital
beyond the eligibility point. The other eleven securing release had
attorneys active in their behalf and were discharged within an average of four and one-half months from the eligibility point. Comparison of the total hospitalization time revealed an even more striking
disparity. Excluding six patients whose commitment period was too
short for meaningful comparison from our total of twenty-nine, the
ten patients without legal assistance spent an average of over tw-elve
years in the hospital, 24 while the thirteen with attorneys spent an
average of one year and ten months there. This is a difference of
nearly ten years. It should be noted, however, that three of the patients without legal assistance had such severely defective mental conditions that they were untreatable and no amount of legal assistance
would have affected the length of their stay in the hospital. With
these three patients excluded, the difference is still startling: those
without active legal assistance spent an average of seven years and
seven months at Ionia-five years and nine months longer than the
patients with legal help.
Seven of the patients were released within one year of their commitment, and three of these within only three months, notwithstanding the hospital's general practice of requiring six month's
stabilization. All seven had attorneys active in their behalf. Of those
patients without attorneys who were not so severely ill as to be
untreatable, six had attained the eligibility point for discharge and
at the very least should have received an independent psychiatric
examination to determine if they could safely be released. Yet as of
October 31, 1966, these patients had spent an average of one year
and ten months in Ionia beyond the point where they had apparently recovered. The average total hospitalization time for the thirteen patients with attorneys was a few days less than that.
These statistics indicate that there is a clear danger of prolonged
commitment of non-mentally ill patients. They show that the patient
who did not have legal assistance, either because of financial inability25 or because he was a juvenile and lacked sufficient experience to
enable him to retain an attorney, was denied equivalent access to the
24. This includes patients not discharged as of October 31, 1966.
25. In some of the cases it could not be determined from the files whether the
patient was financially unable to obtain private counsel. It may be that funds
were available but that the inmate's mental condition precluded any sort of initiative
on his part or that his attempts were thwarted by relatives or hospital authorities.
The latter was noted in at least one case history.
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channels of discharge. Such a denial, in the case of patients who
could medically and legally qualify for release if given an opportunity, is a most serious invasion of a patient's constitutional rights:
for by reason of invidious economic discrimination, it deprives him
of his most precious freedom-liberty of his person.26 Not only is
this violative of basic notions of due process and equal protection,
but it arguably constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Most
courts have sustained commitment schemes against this latter challenge on the theory that the commitment is civil, not criminal.27
But even this labeling device must fail after the patient has recovered from his illness, since he no longer needs treatment nor presents
a danger to society.
The hypothesis that the most logical safeguard consists of an
active attorney representing the patient can perhaps best be illustrated by two actual Ionia case histories.
Case History "A." The patient was admitted to Ionia in 1940 following an insanity acquittal of murder and was diagnosed as having
a "situational psychosis," "hysterical amnesia," and an "introverted
personality." Although she had periodic contacts with her family,
who retained an attorney, he was not active on her behalf, and she
had no independent resources. Eight years after her admission,
during which time she made steady progress, the hospital found her
no longer psychotic. Her condition remained substantially unchanged for six more years. At that time the hospital concluded she
could be discharged but advised her that only the Governor could
set her free, and they notified her attorney that they were setting in
motion administrative procedures which would culminate in the
Governor acting to release her. The attorney took no active steps to
gain her release and seven months went by before the Attorney General advised the hospital that the Governor would not act to pardon
her. The attorney then obtained a writ of habeas corpus and the
patient was ordered released by the court.
At the very least, this patient remained at Ionia eight months beyond
the point when the hospital formally determined she should be released; since her condition had not changed in the six years preceding this determination, it is likely that she was confined almost
seven years too long. Compare her plight with that of the well-to-do
industrialist in the following illustration.
Case History "B." The defendant, a wealthy industrialist, was
automatically committed following an insanity acquittal on the
charge of murdering his wife, whom he caught with an alleged paramour. The defendant retained three of the leading forensic psychia26. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
27. E.g., In re Golden's Petition, 341 Mass. 672, 171 N.E.2d 473 (1961).

February 1968)

Disposition of the Irresponsible

731

trists in the country to testify at his trial. On admission to Ionia he
was found to be suffering from a personality trait disturbance without
psychosis. Two days later he was seen by a private psychiatrist, and his
attorney moved for a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which was
actively resisted by the State. A compromise was reached whereby
the patient was ordered committed to a Detroit clinic for a month of
observation and study. The clinic examination resulted in a finding
of no psychosis, although he was classed as an emotionally unstable
person. On his return, his attorney secured a hearing on the writ,
and six private psychiatrists testified that he was not psychotic and
would not be harmful to society if released. Although the superintendent of Ionia testified against the release, the court ordered his
discharge.

By actively working on behalf of his client, over the objections of
the hospital superintendent and the prosecutor, the attorney was
able to effect a discharge within four months from the initial commitment.
This comparison points up the effectiveness of the attorney in
this sort of representational role. The lawyer who was successful in
obtaining a timely discharge from Ionia for his client generally took
most, if not all, of the following steps: (I) he made early contact with
the Ionia Superintendent assuring him that the inmate's family desired his return and that proper facilities existed for the successful
transition to freedom; (2) he made regular contacts with the patient,
including personal visits; (3) he saw to it that members of the
patient's family made frequent and regular visits both with the patient and the hospital staff; (4) he employed private psychiatrists and
obtained periodic psychiatric examinations; (5) he discussed the patient's progress with the staff psychiatrist; and (6) he expeditiously
moved for a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus whenever it appeared
that either the private psychiatric testimony clearly supported a discharge or the Superintendent no longer actively opposed a release.28
In short, one could perhaps best characterize the attorney's role as
that of an expert catalyst and champion.
While the necessity for this sort of individual action implies that
the hospital was less than diligent in fulfilling its duty of treatment
and return of the patient, it would be unfair to place the blame
solely with the hospital. On several occasions the hospital had to do
all the work necessary to secure the release, and since there is no
28. The writ of habeas corpus was the only judicial method available for discharge.
The Superintendent did not have power to release a patient automatically committed
as the statute provided that only the Governor with the advice of the Mental Health
Commission could discharge these patients. MICH. COMP. LAws § 766.15c (1948),
repealed by Public Act No. 266, [1966] Mich. Acts 378. Not one person was discharged
by the Governor during the twenty-eight years the statute was in operation.
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legal staff attached to the hospital, it was forced to turn to the Attorney General for legal assistance. The very fact that the Attorney
General is obligated to act on behalf of the State to insure that a
release is not improvident and will not endanger society would tend
to put him in a position of serving two masters. It is reasonable to
assume that the State will not act as quickly or as zealously in the
sole interests of the patient as would a private lawyer. Another focal
point of inertia is in the hospital staff itself. Every time a released
patient commits an act of violence, the hospital comes under severe
public censure and criticism. During the period of the study, Ionia
was the subject of three separate public investigations, culminating
in the recommendation that it be closed. Fighting for its very existence, there was every reason for the hospital to delay a patient's
discharge until the staff was "absolutely certain of his harmlessness
to society."
II.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL

It might be argued that a proposal for legislative reform in this
area is like calling the fire department to put out a lighted match.
After all, in twenty-eight years under the statute there were only
twenty-nine automatic commitments in one of the largest states in
the country. A related pilot study of the problems of the criminally
mentally ill in Michigan, however, revealed that a considerable increase in commitments following insanity acquittals is likely to occur
in the future. The study noted that for many years Michigan prosecutors have been using the incompetency-to-stand-trial procedure
as a convenient but improper disposition of criminal cases.20
Faced with a mentally ill defendant, it became the practice in many
Michigan courts for the prosecution to raise the issue of incompetency and actively to work for pretrial commitment, often over the
objection of the defense. Many courts required nothing beyond a
showing of the existence of mental illness and a psychiatrist's recommendation of needed hospitalization to support its finding of incompetency.30
An incompetency commitment was a valuable prosecutorial device
because the Ionia staff until late 1965 interpreted the relevant statute to require them to retain custody of the defendants until they
were completely "cured" of their mental illness. As a result many
such defendants were kept for treatment even though their mental
29. J. ACHER, R.
36 (1967).
30. Id. at 43.
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condition had improved to the point at which the requirements for
competency would have been satisfied. When these defendants were
finally returned for trial, the charges would ordinarily be dismissed
and the defendants released.31
As a result of a series of outside investigations, the hospital reevaluated its interpretation of the incompetency treatment goals and
began to return defendants to trial when they could meet the legal
test of competency irrespective of the continuance of the underlying
mental illness.32 The result was a marked increase in insanity acquittals and subsequent commitment. Prior to the 1965 shift in the hospital's position, commitments following insanity acquittals averaged
less than four per year; there were fourteen in the first ten months
of 1966 alone. Further, the pre-1965 yearly average of less than one
automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal of murder,
was quickly surpassed when ten such commitments were made in the
first ten months of 1966. There is evidence that many of these trials
resulting in insanity acquittals were little more than informal hearings before the judge. After the prosecutor established an uncontested prima facie case, he would stipulate that mental illness existed
at the time of the offense. Thus the defendant would be quickly
acquitted and recommitted.
Although this Michigan experience is primarily a reaction to an
unusual situation, it does indicate that proper utilization of the incompetency process coupled with the availability of automatic commitment, may result in increased irresponsibility commitments. A
similar increase in prosecutive use of the insanity defense recently
occurred in the District of Columbia for different reasons,33 and
with the increased availability of defense funds to indigents and
expanded understanding and use of psychiatric concepts by lawyers,
31. For example, of the 180 defendants committed to Ionia from Detroit Recorder's
Court who were returned to that court during fiscal 1966, 88% had their charges
dismissed. Id. at 20. This was similar to the practice of many other state courts before
and during this period.
32. IONIA STATE HOSPITAL, A STUDY OF PATIENTS RETURNED TO COURT BY THE IONIA
STATE HOSPITAL AS COMPETENT To STAND TRIAL AS OF AUGUST 31, 1966 (1966) (unpublished report to the Michigan Department of Mental Health). See also Hess 8: Thomas,
Incompetency To Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713-20 (1963); Note, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competency To Stand Trial,
59 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1961).
33. Krash, supra note 6, at 949-51. Insanity acquittals in the District of Columbia
went from none in 1951 to ten in 1955, fourteen in 1956, and thirty in 1959. Krash
attributed this rise to the adoption of the more liberal Durham rule for insanity in
that jurisdiction. At the same time, incompetency commitments diminished markedly
from a yearly figure of between forty-five and sixty to only thirteen by 1963. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CmcuIT, REPORT 0,F THE COMMI'IT.EE ON
PROBLEMS CONNEcnD ·wITH MENTAL ExAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES
BEFORE TRIAL 156 (1965).
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the incidence of insanity acquittals may well increase generally
across the country.
But irrespective of the increase the hospital is now under greater
pressure to treat the ill and discharge the cured. There is no enforcement mechanism for these duties other than the courts-indeed, the
lesson of Rouse is that the courts will enforce the duty to treat the ill
as they have long enforced the duty to discharge the recovered. The
most effective means of providing enforcement is to insure that attorneys are available to all patients committed after an insanity
acquittal, regardless of their financial means. An alternative solution
might be to provide periodic judicial review of each patient's case.
This, however, would be unnecessary in a number of cases, significantly complicate hospital routine, and unduly burden already congested court dockets. As the Michigan study demonstrated, the assistance of an attorney representing the inmate on a continuing basis
is more than adequate.
To implement such a broad and, in some respects, radical program, legislation is required. A model statute, appended hereto, is
therefore proposed to provide any person committed after insanity
acquittal with complete, continuing legal representation, including
the ability to hire private psychiatric or other expert help when appropriate. The statute is drafted with but one class of patient in
mind-those who are committed following an insanity acquittal. It
may be that other classes or indeed all inmates ought to have the
same protection. This would depend, in my view, upon whether they
are abandoned much in the same manner as the Michigan inmate
acquitted by reason of insanity. It is here that the need is most
critical.
APPENDIX

A

PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE

Section 1. Title. An act to provide for the representation of
indigent persons committed to a mental institution following acquittal of a crime because of insanity, during the period of their
commitment or while under the supervision of the said mental
institution.
Section 2. (a) Right to an Attorney. In every criminal case in
which the defendant is acquitted by court or jury of the crime
charged on the grounds [of insanity] [that he was not legally responsible for his act by reason of mental illness existing at the time of
the act] and who shall therefore be committed to a mental institution
shall be entitled to be represented by an attorney during the entire
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period of his confinement and any period of parole, temporary release, conditional release or convalescent care, until unconditionally
discharged from confinement in accordance with law.
(b) Appointment of Counsel. The committing court, following
acquittal by reason of insanity, if satisfied after an appropriate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall
appoint counsel to represent him.
(c) Duration and Substitution of Counsel. A defendant for whom
counsel is appointed shall be represented throughout the period of
commitment to the custody of the hospital including any period of
parole, temporary release, conditional release, or convalescent care.
If at any time after the appointment of counsel, the court making
initial appointment finds that the defendant is financially able to
obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representation,
he may terminate the employment of counsel or authorize partial
payment as the interests of justice may dictate. If at any time during
confinement, either the committing court, or the court situate in
the county where the defendant is confined or is a resident if on
parole, temporary release, conditional release or convalescent care,
finds that any person committed in the manner described in subsection (a) is financially unable to pay for counsel he had previously retained, the court may appoint counsel as provided in subsection (b)
as the interests of justice may dictate. Either of said courts may, at
any time during the aforesaid period of custody or supervision, in
the interests of justice substitute one appointed counsel for another.
(d) Payment for Representation. An attorney appointed pursuant
to this section shall at the end of the representation, or semiannually
in the event that the representation extends six months or more, be
compensated at a rate not exceeding $15 per hour for time spent in
any court or administrative hearing and $10 per hour for time reasonably spent out of court and shall be reimbursed for expenses
reasonably incurred. Each claim shall be supported by a written
statement specifying the time spent, services rendered, and expenses
incurred and, in addition, any compensation or reimbursement applied for and received on behalf of the said patient from any other
source. Upon submission for approval to the court making the appointment, the court shall in each instance fix the compensation and
reimbursement to be paid to the attorney. Compensation for time
spent out of court, exclusive of reimbursement of expenses, to an
attorney under this Act shall not exceed $150 in any six-month
period. Compensation for time spent in court or in an administrative hearing shall not exceed $250 in any six-month period. In extra-
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ordinary circumstances payment in excess of the limits set forth
herein may be made if the court making the appointment certifies
that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted representation and the amount of the excess payment is approved by a judge of an appellate court. In the event of representation
of the inmate in any appellate proceedings the attorney shall be
entitled to receive in compensation and in addition to any other
compensation such sums as may be approved in the discretion of the
appellate court but in no event to exceed the sum of $250 together
with reimbursement of any expenses reasonably necessary to prosecute such appeal.
(e) Services Other Than Counsel. Counsel for any inmate committed in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) unable to
obtain expert or other services necessary to reviewing the inmate's
mental condition and recuperative progress while in the custody or
under the supervision of the hospital may request such services by
an application to the committing court or the court making the appointment of counsel. Upon finding after appropriate inquiry that
the services are necessary and that the inmate is financially unable
to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services on behalf of the inmate. The court shall determine reasonable
compensation for the services and direct payment to the organization
or person who rendered them upon a filing of a claim for compensation supported by an affidavit specifying the time spent, services
rendered and expenses incurred on behalf of the inmate and any
compensation received for the same services from any other source.
The compensation to be paid to a person for such services rendered
by him to an inmate under this subsection, or to be paid to an organization for such services rendered by an employee thereof, shall not
exceed $250 in any six-month period, exclusive of reimbursement
for expenses reasonably incurred.
(f) Payment Source. Payment of compensation to the attorney or
for the services set forth in subsection (e) together with expenses
reasonably incurred shall be made by the County Treasurer of the
county wherein the appointment was made. The county shall be
entitled to reimbursement of such payment from the state.
(g) The term "inmate" as used in this section means the defendant committed to a hospital following acquittal of a crime by
reason of insanity.

